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Abstract
The paper reviews some additive and multiplicative properties of ranking pro-
cedures used for generalized tournaments with missing values and multiple compar-
isons. The methods analysed are the score, generalised row sum and least squares
as well as fair bets and its variants. It is argued that generalised row sum should be
applied not with a fixed parameter, but a variable one proportional to the number
of known comparisons. It is shown that a natural additive property has strong links
to independence of irrelevant matches, an axiom judged unfavourable when players
have different opponents.
JEL classification number: D71
Keywords: Preference aggregation, Tournament ranking, Paired comparison, Ax-
iomatic approach
1 Introduction
Paired-comparison based ranking problems are given by a set of objects and a tournament
matrix, which represents the performance of objects against each other. They arise in
many different fields like social choice theory (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998), sports
(Landau, 1895, 1914; Zermelo, 1928) or psychology (Thurstone, 1927). The usual goal is
to determine a winner (a set of winners) or a complete ranking for the objects. There were
some attempts to link the two areas (i.e. Bouyssou (2004)), however, their results seem
to be limited. We will deal only with the latter problem, allowing for different preference
intensities (including ties), incomplete and multiple comparisons among the objects.
Ranking procedures are usually given as functions associating a score for each object
and a higher score corresponds to a better ranking. The literature on these methods
has expanded significantly (for reviews, see Laslier (1997) and Chebotarev and Shamis
∗We are grateful to Julio Gonza´lez-Dı´az for his remark about homogeneity.
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(1998)), so there is a real need for some guidelines about the choice of the appropriate
procedure. It may be achieved by studying their axiomatic properties. Characterization
results on this general domain are limited, we know them only for fair bets (Slutzki and
Volij, 2005) and invariant methods (Slutzki and Volij, 2006). Our goal is to investigate
some scoring procedures with respect to a set of properties, naturally arising from the
setting. Our results supplement Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014)’s findings by analysing new
methods and axioms.
Because of the large amount of ranking methods discussed in the different fields, some
selection is needed. We will mainly concentrate on the following procedures.
• Score: a natural method for binary tournaments (for characterizations on re-
stricted domains, see Young (1974); Hansson and Sahlquist (1976); Rubinstein
(1980); Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981); Bouyssou (1992)).
• Least squares: a well-known procedure in statistics and psychology (see Thur-
stone (1927); Gulliksen (1956); Kaiser and Serlin (1978)).
• Generalised row sum: a parametric family of ranking methods resulting in
the score and least squares as limits (see Chebotarev (1989, 1994)).
• Fair bets: an extensively studied method in social choice theory as well as for
ranking the nodes of directed graphs (see Daniels (1969); Moon and Pullman
(1970); Slutzki and Volij (2005, 2006); Slikker et al. (2012)).
• Dual fair bets: a scoring procedure obtained from fair bets by ’reversing’ an
axiom in its characterization (see Slutzki and Volij (2005)).
• Copeland fair bets: a new method introduced in the current paper by ap-
plying the idea of Herings et al. (2005) for fair bets.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the ranking methods above in the
view of a set of axioms. It helps in understanding the different procedures and reveals the
connections of the properties investigated. For instance, Copeland fair bets is proposed
because Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) considers that its major weakness is the violation
of inversion, which imposes the requirement that if all the results are reversed, then the
corresponding ranking should be obtained by reversing the original ranking as well. The
significance of certain axioms for applications will also be emphasized. Thorough analysis
of these properties may support the work towards the characterization of some methods,
too.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 our setting and definitions are pre-
sented. Section 3 exhibits three main properties with a significance for later discussion. In
Section 4 we deal with two possible multiplicative axioms. Section 5 reviews four axioms
linked to adding of ranking problems. In Section 6, we argue that the strongest additive
property has unfavourable implications on the general domain used. Finally, Section 7
concludes the results, summarized visually in a table and a graph.
2 Notations and rating methods
Let N = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, n ∈ N be a set of objects and A = (aij) ∈ Rn×n be a
tournament matrix such that aij + aji ∈ N. aij represents the aggregate score of object
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Xi against Xj, aij/(aij +aji) may be interpreted as the likelihood that object Xi is better
than object Xj. aii = 0 is assumed for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, diagonal entries will have
no significance in the discussion. A possible derivation of the tournament matrix can
be found in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) and Csato´ (2014). This notation also follows
Chebotarev and Shamis (1998).
The pair (N,A) is called a ranking problem.1 The set of ranking problems is denoted
by R. A scoring procedure f is an R → Rn function, fi = fi(N,A) is the rating of
object Xi. It immediately determines a ranking (transitive and complete weak order on
the set N ×N) , where fi ≥ fj means that Xi is ranked weakly above Xj, denoted by
Xi  Xj. Ratings provide cardinal and rankings provide ordinal information about the
objects. Throughout the paper, the notions of rating and ranking methods will be used
analogously since only scoring procedures are discussed.
To each ranking problem (N,A) ∈ R, we associate a results matrix R = A − A> =
(rij) ∈ Rn×n and a matches matrix M = A+A> = (mij) ∈ Nn×n, where mij is the number
of the comparisons between Xi and Xj, whose the outcome is given by rij. di =
∑n
j=1mij
is the total number of comparisons of object Xi. m = maxXi,Xj∈N mij is the maximal
number of comparisons in the ranking problem. A ranking problem is called round-robin
if mij = m for all Xi 6= Xj, namely, every object has been compared with all the others
exactly as many times. The set of round-robin ranking problems is denoted by RR.
Note that ranking problem can be also defined by matrices R and M with the restriction
|rij| ≤ mij for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Ranking of the objects involves three main challenges. The first one is the possible
appearance of circular triads, when object Xi is better than Xj (that is, aij > aji), Xj is
better than Xk, but Xk is better than Xi. If preference intensities also count as in the
model above, other triplets (Xi, Xj, Xk) may produce problems, too. The second problem
is that the performance of objects compared with Xi strongly influences the observable
paired comparison outcomes aij. For example, if Xi was compared only with Xj, then
its rating may depend on the results of Xj. The third difficulty is given by the different
number of comparisons of the objects, di 6= dj. According to David (1987, p. 1), it
must be realized that there can be no entirely satisfactory way of ranking if the number
of replications of each object varies appreciably. Despite this we do not deal with the
question whether a given dataset may be globally ranked in a meaningful way or the data
is inherently inconsistent, an issue investigated for example by Jiang et al. (2011). Since
each problem occur if n ≥ 3, the case of two objects becomes trivial.
Matrix M can be represented by an undirected multigraph G := (V,E) where vertex
set V corresponds to the object set N , and the number of edges between objects Xi and Xj
is equal to mij. Therefore the degree of node Xi is di. Graph G is called the comparison
multigraph associated with the ranking problem (N,R,M), however, it is independent of
the results matrix R. The Laplacian matrix L = (`ij) , i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n of graph G is
given by `ij = −mij for all Xi 6= Xj and `ii = di for all Xi ∈ N .
A path from Xk1 to Xkt is a sequence of objects Xk1 , Xk2 , . . . , Xkt such that mk`k`+1 > 0
for all ` = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1. Two objects are connected if there exists a path between them.
Ranking problem (N,A) ∈ R is said to be connected if every pair of objects is connected.
The set of connected ranking problems is denoted by RC .
A directed path from Xk1 to Xkt is a sequence of objects Xk1 , Xk2 , . . . , Xkt such that
ak`k`+1 > 0 for all ` = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. Objects Xi and Xj are in the same league if there
1 In certain cases we will denote it only by the tournament matrix A, whose rows already determine
the set of objects N .
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exists a directed path from Xi to Xj and from Xj to Xi. Ranking problem (N,A) ∈ R
is called irreducible if every pair of objects is in the same league. The set of irreducible
ranking problems is denoted by RI .
Let e ∈ Rn be the unit column vector, that is, ei = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let
I ∈ Rn×n be the identity matrix, and L be the Laplacian matrix of the comparison
multigraph G associated with the ranking problem (N,A).
Now we define some rating methods. The first one does not take the comparison
structure into account.
Definition 2.1. Score: s(N,R,M) = Re.
Score will also be referred to as row sum. The following parametric rating method was
constructed axiomatically by Chebotarev (1989) and thoroughly analyzed in Chebotarev
(1994).
Definition 2.2. Generalized row sum: it is the unique solution x(ε)(N,R,M) of
the system of linear equations (I + εL)x(ε)(N,R,M) = (1 + εmn)s, where ε > 0 is a
parameter.
It adjusts the standard score si by accounting for the performance of objects compared
with Xi, and adds an infinite depth to this argument since scores of all objects available on
a path appear in the calculation. ε indicates the importance attributed to this correction.
An alternative solution would be to count only the scores of direct opponents as in David
(1987).
Lemma 2.1. Generalised row sum results in row sum if ε→ 0: limε→0 x(ε)(N,R,M) =
s(N,R,M).
There are few information about the choice of parameter ε. In our case, the value of
rij is limited by −mij and mij, thus some conditions can be made on ε.
Definition 2.3. Reasonable choice of ε (Chebotarev, 1994, Proposition 5.1): Let
(N,R,M) ∈ R be a ranking problem. Reasonableness for the choice of ε amounts to
satisfying the constraint
0 < ε ≤ 1
m(n− 2) .
Reasonable upper bound of ε is 1/ [m(n− 2)].
The reasonable choice is not well-defined in the trivial case of n = 2, thus n ≥ 3 is
implicitly assumed in the following.
Proposition 2.1. For the generalised row sum method with a reasonable choice of ε,
−m(n− 1) ≤ xi(ε)(N,R,M) ≤ m(n− 1) for all Xi ∈ N .
Proof. See Chebotarev (1994, Property 13).
It is favourable as in a round-robin ranking problem −m(n − 1) ≤ si(N,R,M) ≤
m(n− 1) for all Xi ∈ N .
Both the score and generalized row sum ratings are well-defined and easily computable
from a system of linear equations for all ranking problems (N,R,M) ∈ R.
The least squares method was suggested by Thurstone (1927) and Horst (1932). Other
references can be found in Csato´ (2014).
4
Definition 2.4. Least squares: it is the solution q(N,R,M) of the system of linear
equations Lq(N,R,M) = s(N,R,M) and e>q(N,R,M) = 0.
Lemma 2.2. Generalised row sum results in least squares if ε→∞:
lim
ε→∞
x(ε)(N,R,M) = mnq(N,R,M).
Proposition 2.2. The least squares rating is unique if and only if comparison multigraph
G is connected.
Proof. See Bozo´ki et al. (2014). Chebotarev and Shamis (1999, p. 220) mention this fact
without further discussion.
An extensive analysis and a graph interpretation of the least squares method can be
found in Csato´ (2014).
Several scoring procedures build upon the idea of rewarding wins without punishing
losses. Two early contributions in this field are Wei (1952) and Kendall (1955). They have
been studied in social choice and game theory by Borm et al. (2002); Herings et al. (2005);
Slikker et al. (2012); Slutzki and Volij (2005, 2006). One of the most widely used method
within this framework is the fair bets method, originally suggested by Daniels (1969) and
Moon and Pullman (1970), and axiomatically characterized by Slutzki and Volij (2005)
and Slutzki and Volij (2006). Its properties have been investigated by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.
(2014).
Let F = diag(A>e), an n × n diagonal matrix with the number of losses for each
object.
Definition 2.5. Fair bets: it is the solution fb(N,A) of the system of linear equations
F−1Afb(N,A) = fb(N,A) and e>fb(N,A) = 1.
Proposition 2.3. The fair bets rating is unique if the ranking problem is irreducible.
Proof. See Moon and Pullman (1970).
For reducible ranking problems, Perron-Frobenius theorem does not guarantee that
the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue is strictly positive.
Therefore we restrict our analysis to the class of connected ranking problems RC , and
to the set of irreducible ranking problems RI in the case of fair bets. However, for ranking
problems without a connected comparison multigraph, rating of all objects on a common
scale seems to be arbitrary.
The idea behind the fair bets method is to give more weight to wins against better
objects than to losses against worse objects. It includes a subjective judgement in it:
analogously, one may argue that the latter is more favourable. This approach is taken
by the dual fair bets method (Slutzki and Volij, 2005) using the transposed tournament
matrix A>, however, in this case a lower value is better.
Definition 2.6. Dual fair bets: it is the opposite of the solution dfb∗(N,A) of system
of linear equations [diag(Ae)]−1A>dfb∗(N,A) = dfb∗(N,A) and e>dfb∗(N,A) = 1.
The transformation dfb(N,A) = −dfb∗(N,A) is necessary in order to ensure that
Xi  Xj ⇔ dfbi(N,A) ≥ dfbj(N,A) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
In fact, the axiomatization of fair bets also characterizes the dual fair bets by chang-
ing only one property, negative responsiveness to losses with positive responsiveness to
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wins (Slutzki and Volij, 2005, Remark 1). This differentiation can be seen in the case of
positional power, too, by the definition of positional power and positional weakness (Her-
ings et al., 2005). Similarly to the latter paper’s Copeland positional value, we introduce
Copeland fair bets method.
Definition 2.7. Copeland fair bets: Cfb(N,A) it is the sum of the fair bets and dual
fair bets ratings, Cfb(N,A) = Cfb(N,A) + dfb(N,A).
Now Xi  Xj ⇔ Cfbi(N,A) ≥ Cfbj(N,A) as earlier. According to our knowledge,
we are the first to define this scoring procedure.
These are the six scoring procedures (or, in the case of generalised row sum, a family
of them) discussed in the article. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) have analysed the least
squares and fair bets methods, as well as generalised row sum with the parameter ε =
1/ [m(n− 2)]. They use a different version of the score, si/di for all Xi ∈ N .
Ranking problem (N,R,M) ∈ R can be represented by a graph such that the nodes
are the objects, k times (Xi, Xj) ∈ N ×N undirected edge means rij(= rji) = 0, mij = k,
and k times (Xi, Xj) ∈ N × N directed edge means rij = k (rji = −k), mij = k. We
think it helps a lot in understanding the examples.
Figure 1: Ranking problem of Example 1
X1 X2
X3
X4
X5
Example 1. (Chebotarev, 1994, Example 2) Let (N,R,M) ∈ R be the ranking problem
in Figure 1 with the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4, X5}.
The corresponding tournament, results and matches matrices are as follows
A =

0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
 , R =

0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 −1 0 1
−1 0 1 −1 0
 , M =

0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
 .
The solutions with generalised row sum for various values of ε are given in Table 1.
Here m = 1 and n = 5, thus ε = 1/3 is the reasonable upper bound. For all parameter
greater than 0, the ranking is X1  X2  X3  X4  X5 since X1 dominates X5, which
effects X3 and X4 through the circular triad (X3, X4, X5). However, X3 has a draw against
X2. Note that X2 ∼ X3 ∼ X4 for the score and least squares methods, referring to a kind
of neglect of the comparison (X2, X3).
It is an irreducible ranking problem, so fair bets rating is not unique. Nevertheless, a
ranking can be obtained by the application of its extension according to Slutzki and Volij
(2005): X1 is the best object as no other has a chance to defeat it, and the remaining four
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Table 1: x(ε) rating vectors of Example 1
ε 0 1/100 1/4 1/3 1 5 →∞
X1 1.0000 1.0296 1.7165 2.2649 2.4242 3.4369 4.0000
X2 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0613 −0.1917 −0.2424 −0.6819 −1.0000
X3 0.0000 −0.0099 −0.2452 −0.4314 −0.4848 −0.8183 −1.0000
X4 0.0000 −0.0100 −0.2759 −0.4878 −0.5455 −0.8609 −1.0000
X5 −1.0000 −1.0096 −1.1341 −1.1540 −1.1515 −1.0757 −1.0000
form an irreducible component. It gives the fair bets ranking as X1  (X2 ∼ X3 ∼ X4 ∼
X5), which coincides with the one from least squares. Similarly, both dual fair bets and
Copeland fair bets result in X1  (X2 ∼ X3 ∼ X4 ∼ X5).
3 Structural invariance properties
Our axiomatic discussion begins with some basic properties already known from the lit-
erature.
Definition 3.1. Neutrality (NEU) (Young, 1974): Let (N,R,M) ∈ R be a ranking
problem and σ : N → N be a permutation on the set of objects. Let σ(N,R,M) ∈ R be the
ranking problem obtained from (N,R,M) by this permutation. Scoring procedure f : R →
Rn is neutral if for all Xi, Xj ∈ N : fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) ⇔ fσi [σ(N,R,M)] ≥
fσj [σ(N,R,M)].
In some articles, it is called anonymity (Bouyssou, 1992; Slutzki and Volij, 2005;
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014). It is equivalent with requiring that the permutation of two
objects do not affect the ranking as in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014).
Remark 1. Let f : R → Rn be a neutral scoring procedure. If for the objects Xi, Xj ∈ N ,
mij = 0, and rik = rjk, mik = mjk for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}, then fi(N,R,M) =
fj(N,R,M) (Bouyssou, 1992, p. 62).
Lemma 3.1. All methods presented above satisfy NEU .
Definition 3.2. Symmetry (SYM) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let (N,R,M) ∈ R
be a ranking problem such that R = 0. Scoring procedure f : R → Rn is symmetric if
fi(N,R,M) = fj(N,R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Symmetry does not require di = dj for the pair (Xi, Xj). Young (1974) and Nitzan and
Rubinstein (1981, Axiom 4) use the axiom cancellation for round-robin ranking problems,
which coincides with symmetry on this set.
Lemma 3.2. All methods presented above satisfy SYM .
Definition 3.3. Inversion (INV ) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998): Let (N,R,M) ∈ R
be a ranking problem. Scoring procedure f : R → Rn is invertible if fi(N,R,M) ≥
fj(N,R,M)⇔ fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Inversion means that taking the opposite of each result changes the ranking accord-
ingly. It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and defeats. Chebotarev (1994,
Property 7) defines transposability such that the ratings change their sign and keep the
same absolute value.
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Remark 2. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure satisfying INV . Then fi(N,R,M) >
fj(N,R,M)⇔ fi(N,−R,M) < fj(N,−R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
The following result is mentioned by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 150).
Corollary 1. INV implies SYM .
Lemma 3.3. The score, generalised row sum and least squares methods satisfy INV .
Proof. It is the immediate consequence of s(N,−R,M) = −s(N,R,M).
Lemma 3.4. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods do not satisfy INV on the set RR.
Proof. For fair bets, see Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Example 4.4). The same counterex-
ample with a transposed tournament matrix proves the statement for dual fair bets.
So axiom INV is not satisfied by the two methods still on the restricted domain of
round-robin problems.
Lemma 3.5. Copeland fair bets satisfies INV .
Proof. Take ranking problems (N,A) and (N,A>). Cfb(N,A) = fb(N,A)+dfb(N,A) =
−dfb(N,A>)− fb(N,A>) = −Cfb(N,A>).
Hence Copeland fair bets eliminates the major weakness of fair bets according to
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 164), while retains its favourable properties.
4 Multiplicative properties
The following axiom refers to proportional modification of the ranking problem.
Definition 4.1. Homogeneity (HOM) (Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014): Let (N,R,M) ∈ R
be a ranking problem and k > 0 such that (N, kR, kM) ∈ R. Scoring procedure f : R →
Rn is homogeneous, if fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) ⇔ fi(N, kR, kM) ≥ fj(N, kR, kM)
for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .2
In our setting the elements of kM should be integers, which is not required by
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014).
Lemma 4.1. The score and least squares methods satisfy HOM .
Generalised row sum should be examined with some caution since it is a whole family
of scoring procedures. First, we regard it with a constant parameter ε.
Proposition 4.1. The generalised row sum method with a fixed ε violates HOM .
Proof.
2 Since k > 0, positive homogeneity may be a better name for this axiom, but we wanted to retain
the original definition.
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Figure 2: Ranking problem of Example 2
X1
X2X3
Example 2. Let (N,R,M) ∈ R be the ranking problem in Figure 2 with the set of objects
N = {X1, X2, X3} and tournament matrix
A =
 0 1.5 10.5 0 3
0.5 0 0
 .
Let k = 2.
Here m = 3 and n = 3, the reasonable upper bound of ε is 1/3. Let choose it as a
fixed parameter:
x(1/5)(N,R,M) = [2.0000; 2.0000; −4.0000]> , and
x(1/5)(N, 2R, 2M) = [4.5352; 3.9437; −8.4789]> ,
implying X1 ∼x(1/3)(N,R,M) X2 but X1 x(1/3)(N,2R,2M) X2.
Now allow ε to depend on the matches matrix M .
Proposition 4.2. The generalised row sum method with a variable ε satisfies HOM if
ε(k) is inversely proportional to k, that is, ε(k) = ε(1)/k = ε/k.
Proof. It yields from some basic calculations:
x (ε(k)) (N, kR, kM) = (1 + εmn)(I + εL)−1s(N, kR, kM) = kx(ε)(N,R,M).
Remark 3. The reasonable upper bound ε = 1 [m(n− 2)] is inversely proportional to k.
Conjecture 1. The proof of Proposition 4.2 suggests that generalised row sum violates
HOM if ε is not inversely proportional to k.
Lemma 4.2. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods satisfy HOM .
Proof. Regarding fair bets, fb(N, kA) = fb(N,A) since (kF )−1 = (1/k)F−1. It shows the
homogeneity of dual fair bets as well, which proves HOM for Copeland fair bets.
It makes sense to deal only with the multiplication of results.
Definition 4.2. Admissible transformation of the results: Let (N,R,M) ∈ R be a rank-
ing problem. An admissible transformation of the results provides a ranking problem
(N, kR,M) ∈ R such that k > 0, k ∈ R and krij ∈ [−mij,mij] for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
9
k cannot be arbitrarily large in order to retain the condition |rij| ≤ mij. For instance,
in Example 2 maxXi,Xj∈N rij/mij = max{1/3; 3/5} = 3/5, therefore 0 < k ≤ 5/3 makes
(N, kR,M) ∈ R a ranking problem provided through an admissible transformation of the
results. On the other hand, 0 < k ≤ 1 is always possible.
Definition 4.3. Scale invariance (SI): Let (N,R,M), (N, kR,M) ∈ R be two rank-
ing problems such that (N, kR,M) is obtained from (N,R,M) through an admissible
transformation of the results. Scoring procedure f : R → Rn is scale invariant if
fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M)⇔ fi(N, kR,M) ≥ fj(N, kR,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Scale invariance implies that the ranking is invariant to a proportional modification
of wins (rij > 0) and losses (rij < 0). It seems to be important for applications. If the
paired comparison outcomes cannot be measured on a continuous scale, it is not trivial
how to transform them into rij values. SI provides that it is not a problem in several
cases. For example, if only three outcomes are possible, the coding (rij = κ for wins;
rij = 0 for draws; rij = −κ for losses) makes the ranking independent from κ. It may
be advantageous, too, when relative intensities, such as a regular win is two times better
than an overtime triumph, are known.
Remark 4. Take the tournament matrix A, where aij = (rij + mij)/2. Through an
admissible transformation of the results, every reducible A can be made irreducible (by all
k < 1) if the ranking problem is connected.
Remark 4 offers a way to extend scale invariant scoring procedures unique on the
domain RI to RC .
Lemma 4.3. The score, generalised row sum and least squares methods satisfy SI.
Proof. It is the immediate consequence of s(N, kR,M) = ks(N,R,M).
Proposition 4.3. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate SI.
Figure 3: Ranking problem of Example 3
X1
X2X3
Proof.
Example 3. Let (N,A) ∈ R be the ranking problem in Figure 3 with the set of objects
N = {X1, X2, X3} and tournament matrix
A =
0 3 00 0 1
4 0 0
 .
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Table 2: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 3
fb(N,A) dfb(N,A) Cfb(N,A) fb(N,A′) dfb(N,A′) Cfb(N,A′)
X1 1/3 −1/3 0 67/247 −75/247 −8/247
X2 1/3 −1/3 0 3/13 −121/247 −64/247
X3 1/3 −1/3 0 123/247 −51/247 72/247
Let k = 0.5, resulting in the tournament matrix
A′ =
 0 2.25 10.75 0 0.75
3 0.25 0
 .
The rating vectors are given in Table 2. Thus fb1(N,A) ≤ fb2(N,A), dfb1(N,A) ≤
dfb2(N,A) and Cfb1(N,A) ≤ Cfb2(N,A), but fb1(N,A′) > fb2(N,A′), dfb1(N,A′) >
dfb2(N,A
′) and Cfb1(N,A′) > Cfb2(N,A′), which is a contradiction.
Similarly to Lemma 3.3, it is worth to examine the two multiplicative properties on
the domain of round-robin ranking problems. Note that the set RR is closed under
modifications allowed by HOM and SI (admissible transformation of the results).
Lemma 4.4. The generalised row sum satisfies HOM on the set RR.
Proof. Due to the axiom agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3), generalised row sum
coincides with the score on this set of problems, so Lemma 4.1 holds.
Example 3 is unbalanced, the degree of the three nodes varies from 4 to 7. As it was
mentioned in Section 2, in this case the ranking may be not meaningful. It also justifies
the investigation of round-robin problems.
Proposition 4.4. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate SI on
the set RR.
Figure 4: Ranking problem of Example 4
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
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Example 4. Let (N,A) ∈ RR be the round-robin ranking problem in Figure 4 with the
set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrix
A =

0 2 0 3
1 0 0 0
3 3 0 2
0 3 1 0
 .
Let k = 0.5, resulting in the tournament matrix
A′ =

0 1.75 0.75 2.25
1.25 0 0.75 0.75
2.25 2.25 0 1.75
1.75 2.25 1.25 0
 .
Table 3: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 4
fb(N,A) dfb(N,A) Cfb(N,A) fb(N,A′) dfb(N,A′) Cfb(N,A′)
X1 8/66 −10/66 −1/33 67/282 −59/282 4/141
X2 1/66 −47/66 −23/33 35/282 −121/282 −43/141
X3 47/66 −1/66 23/33 121/282 −35/282 43/141
X4 10/66 −8/66 1/33 59/282 −67/282 −4/141
The rating vectors are given in Table 3. Hence fb1(N,A) < fb4(N,A), dfb1(N,A) <
dfb4(N,A) and Cfb1(N,A) < Cfb4(N,A), but fb1(N,A
′) > fb4(N,A′), dfb1(N,A′) >
dfb4(N,A
′) and Cfb1(N,A′) > Cfb4(N,A′), which proves the statement for fair bets and
Copeland fair bets.
The other partial version of positive homogeneity, when matrix M is multiplied by
k > 0, has no relevance. Moreover, HOM and SI already imply the respective property.
5 Additive properties
Definition 5.1. Consistency (CS) (Young, 1974): Let (N,R,M), (N,R′,M ′) ∈ R be
two ranking problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring
procedure such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) and fi(N,R′,M ′) ≥ fj(N,R′,M ′). f is
called consistent if fi(N,R+R
′,M +M ′) ≥ fj(N,R+R′,M +M ′), moreover, fi(N,R+
R′,M + M ′) > fj(N,R + R′,M + M ′) if fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M) or fi(N,R′,M ′) >
fj(N,R
′,M ′).
CS is the most intuitive version of additivity.
Lemma 5.1. The score method satisfies CS.
Proposition 5.1. The generalised row sum and least squares methods violate CS.
Proof.
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Figure 5: Ranking problems of Example 5
(a) Ranking problem (N,R,M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N,R′,M ′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Example 5. Let (N,R,M) ∈ R and (N,R′,M ′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure
5 with the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
A =

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
 and A′ =

0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 .
Let (N,R′′,M ′′) = (N,R +R′,M +M ′) ∈ R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
Let x(ε)(N,R,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,R′,M ′) = x(ε)′, x(ε)(N,R′′,M ′′) = x(ε)′′ and
q(N,R,M) = q, q(N,R′,M ′) = q′, q(N,R′′,M ′′) = q′′. Now n = 4, m = m′ = 1, thus
m′′ = 2 and
x1(ε) = x2(ε) = −1 + 10ε+ 32ε
2 + 32ε3
1 + 12ε+ 44ε2 + 48ε3
, and
x1(ε)
′ = x2(ε)′ = −1, but
x1(ε)
′′ − x2(ε)′′ = − 2ε+ 36ε
2 + 160ε3
1 + 22ε+ 154ε2 + 340ε3
< 0.
It implies that X1 ∼x(ε)(N,R,M) X2 and X1 ∼x(ε)(N,R′,M) X2, however, X1 ≺x(ε)(N,R′′,M ′′) X2. Gener-
alised row sum is not consistent for any ε.
Regarding the least squares method, on the basis of Lemma 2.2:
q1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
mn
=
limε→∞ x2(ε)
mn
= q2, and
q′1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)′
m′n
=
limε→∞ x2(ε)′
m′n
= q′2, but
q′′1 − q′′2 =
limε→∞ [x1(ε)′′ − x2(ε)′′]
m′′n
= − 1
17
< 0.
Hence X1 ∼q(N,R,M) X2 and X1 ∼q(N,R′,M ′) X2 but X1 ≺q(N,R′′,M ′′) X2.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Example 4.2) have shown the violation of a somewhat
weaker property called order preservation for the least squares and generalised row sum
with ε = 1/ [m(n− 2)], since there di/dj = d′i/d′j for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
We will return later to the examination of fair bets and connected methods.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) discusses the following restricted version of additivity.
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Definition 5.2. Flatness preservation (FP ) (Slutzki and Volij, 2005): Let (N,R,M),
(N,R′,M ′) ∈ R be two ranking problems. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure such
that fi(N,R,M) = fj(N,R,M) and fi(N,R
′,M ′) = fj(N,R′,M ′) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N . f
preserves flatness if fi(N,R +R
′,M +M ′) = fj(N,R +R′,M +M ′) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
Flatness preservation demands additivity only for problems with all objects ranked
equally.
Corollary 2. CS implies FP .
Lemma 5.2. The score, generalised row sum and least squares methods satisfy FP .
Proof. It has been shown in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Corollary 4.3) for the least squares,
and in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, Proposition 4.2) for generalised row sum with ε =
1/ [m(n− 2)].
The score method preserves flatness due to Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 2.
If xi(ε)(N,R,M) = xj(ε)(N,R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N , then x(ε)(N,R,M) = 0. We
prove that s(N,R,M) = 0 ⇔ x(ε)(N,R,M) = 0. si(N,R,M) = sj(N,R,M) for all
Xi, Xj ∈ N implies s(N,R,M) = 0, therefore x(ε)(N,R,M) = 0. If x(ε)(N,R,M) = 0,
then (1 + εmn)s = 0, so s = 0.
The same argument can be applied in the case of least squares.
Lemma 5.3. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods satisfy FP .
Proof. Regarding the fair bets see Slutzki and Volij (2005, Theorem 1). According to
Slutzki and Volij (2005, Remark 1), it is true for dual fair bets. It implies that Copeland
fair bets preserves flatness.
All objects ranked equally seems to be a strong condition, so it makes sense to require
additivity on a larger set. A natural choice can be that only the objects examined are
ranked equally.
Definition 5.3. Equality preservation (EP ): Let (N,R,M), (N,R′,M ′) ∈ R be two
ranking problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure
such that fi(N,R,M) = fj(N,R,M) and fi(N,R
′,M ′) = fj(N,R′,M ′). f preserves
equality if fi(N,R +R
′,M +M ′) = fj(N,R +R′,M +M ′).
Corollary 3. CS implies EP .
EP implies FP .
Lemma 5.4. The score method satisfies EP .
Proof. It comes from Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 3.
Lemma 5.5. The generalised row sum and least squares methods violate EP .
Proof. x1(ε) = x2(ε) and q1 = q2 as well as x1(ε)
′ = x2(ε)′ and q′1 = q
′
2, but x1(ε)
′′ = x2(ε)′′
and q′′1 = q
′′
2 in Example 5.
Proposition 5.2. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate EP .
Proof.
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Figure 6: Ranking problems of Example 6
(a) Ranking problem (N,A)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N,A′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Example 6. Let (N,A) ∈ R and (N,A′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 6 with
the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
A =

0 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0 1 0.5
0.5 0 0 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0
 and A′ =

0 1 0.5 0.5
0 0 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0
 .
Let (N,A′′) = (N,A+ A′) ∈ R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
Table 4: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 6
fb(A) dfb(A) Cfb(A) fb(A′) dfb(A′) Cfb(A′) fb(A′′) dfb(A′′) Cfb(A′′)
X1 1/4 −1/4 0 3/8 −1/8 1/4 163/512 −101/512 31/256
X2 3/8 −1/8 1/4 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 117/512 −115/512 1/256
X3 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 1/8 −3/8 −1/4 75/512 −205/512 −65/256
X4 1/4 −1/4 0 3/8 −1/8 1/4 157/512 −91/512 33/256
The rating vectors are given in Table 4, where fb1(N,A) = fb4(N,A), dfb1(N,A) =
dfb4(N,A), Cfb1(N,A) = Cfb4(N,A), similarly, fb1(N,A
′) = fb4(N,A′), dfb1(N,A′) =
dfb4(N,A
′), Cfb1(N,A′) = Cfb4(N,A′), but fb1(N,A′′) > fb4(N,A′′), dfb1(N,A′′) <
dfb4(N,A
′′), Cfb1(N,A′′) < Cfb4(N,A′′), which is a contradiction.
Lemma 5.6. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate CS.
Proof. It comes from Proposition 5.2 with Corollary 3.
In the weakening of axiom CS, another natural restriction can be to allow only for
the combination of ranking problems with the same matches matrix, when the effects of
different comparison multigraphs are eliminated.
Definition 5.4. Result consistency (RCS): Let (N,R,M), (N,R′,M) ∈ R be two rank-
ing problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two objects. Let f : R → Rn be a scoring procedure
such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) and fi(N,R′,M) ≥ fj(N,R′,M). f is called result
consistent if fi(N,R + R
′, 2M) ≥ fj(N,R + R′, 2M), moreover, fi(N,R + R′, 2M) >
fj(N,R +R
′, 2M) if fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M) or fi(N,R′,M) > fj(N,R′,M).
15
Corollary 4. CS implies RCS.
Corollary 5. RCS (hence CS) implies HOM for all positive integer k.
Because of Corollary 5, generalised row sum with a constant value of ε = 1/3 violates
of consistency according to Example 2 as k = 2.
Proposition 5.3. RCS and SYM implies INV .
Proof. Take a ranking problem (N,R,M) ∈ R, assume that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M)
for objects Xi, Xj ∈ N . If fi(N,−R,M) > fj(N,−R,M), then fi(N,0,M) > fj(N,0,M)
due to RCS, which contradicts to SYM . Therefore fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M).
Corollary 6. CS and SYM implies INV .
Corollary 6 was proved by Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Lemma 1) in the case of
round-robin ranking problems.
Lemma 5.7. The score method satisfies RCS.
Proof. It comes from Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 4.
Proposition 5.4. The least squares method satisfies RCS.
Proof. Let q(N,R,M) = q, q(N,R′,M) = q′ and q(N,R+R′,M+M) = q′′. It is shown
that 2q′′ = q + q′. The Laplacian matrix of the comparison multigraph associated with
matches matrix M +M is 2L, so
2Lq′′ = L (q + q′) = s(N,R,M) + s(N,R′,M) = s(N,R +R′,M +M)
as well as e>q′′ = e> [(1/2)q + (1/2)q′] = 0.
Regarding the generalised row sum, we repeatedly distinguish two cases.
Lemma 5.8. The generalised row sum method with a fixed ε violates RCS.
Proof. Corollary 5 can be applied because of k = 2 in Example 2.
Proposition 5.5. The generalised row sum method with a variable ε satisfies RCS if ε
is inversely proportional to the number of added ranking problems.
Proof. Let x(ε)(N,R,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,R′,M) = x(ε)′ and x(ε)(N,R+R′,M +M) =
x(ε)′′. It yields from some basic calculations:
x(ε/2)′′ = (1 + εmn)(I + εL)−1s(N,R +R′,M +M) =
= (1 + εmn)(I + εL)−1 [s(N,R,M) + s(N,R′,M)] = x + x(ε)′.
Remark 5. The reasonable upper bound of ε = 1 [m(n− 2)] is inversely proportional to
the number of added ranking problems.
Conjecture 2. The proof of Proposition 5.5 suggests that generalised row sum violates
HOM if ε is not inversely proportional to the number of added ranking problems.
Lemma 5.9. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods violate RCS.
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Figure 7: Ranking problems of Example 7
(a) Ranking problem (N,A)
X1
X2X3
(b) Ranking problem (N,A′)
X1
X2X3
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemmata 3.2 and 3.4 with Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.6. Copeland fair bets method violates RCS.
Proof.
Example 7. Let (N,A) ∈ R and (N,A′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 7 with
the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3} and tournament matrices
A =
0 3 00 0 1
4 0 0
 and A′ =
0 1 22 0 0
2 1 0

with the same matches matrix
M =
0 3 43 0 1
4 1 0
 .
Note that ranking problem (N,A) is the same as in Example 3. Let (N,A′′) = (N,A+A′) ∈
R be the sum of these two ranking problems.
Table 5: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 7
fb(A) dfb(A) Cfb(A) fb(A′) dfb(A′) Cfb(A′) fb(A′′) dfb(A′′) Cfb(A′′)
X1 3/19 −1/3 −10/57 2/7 −6/15 −12/105 7/29 −2/6 −16/174
X2 4/19 −1/3 −7/57 2/7 −5/15 −5/105 6/29 −3/6 −51/174
X3 12/19 −1/3 17/57 3/7 −4/15 17/105 16/29 −1/6 67/174
The rating vectors are given in Table 5: Cfb1(N,A) < Cfb2(N,A) and Cfb1(N,A
′) <
Cfb2(N,A
′), but Cfb1(N,A′′) > Cfb2(N,A′′).
Now we analyse the special case of round-robin ranking problems. Note that the set
RR is closed under summation.
Lemma 5.10. The generalised row sum and least squares methods satisfy CS on the set
RR.
Proof. Due to the axioms agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3) and score consistency
(Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014), both the generalised row sum and least squares methods
coincide with the score on this set of problems, so Lemma 5.1 holds.
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Lemma 5.10 shows that lack of additivity in Example 5 is due to the different structure
of the comparison multigraphs.
Lemma 5.11. The generalised row sum satisfies RCS on the set RR.
Proof. It comes from Lemma 5.10 and Corollary 4.
Lemma 5.12. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate EP on the
set RR.
Proof. Both (N,A) ∈ RR and (N,A′) ∈ RR are round-robin ranking problems in Example
6.
Lemma 5.13. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate CS on the
set RR.
Proof. It comes from Proposition 5.7 and Corollary 4.
Lemma 5.14. Fair bets and dual fair bets methods violate RCS.
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemmata 3.2 and 3.4 with Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.7. Copeland fair bets methods violate RCS on the set RR.
Figure 8: Ranking problems of Example 8
(a) Ranking problem (N,A)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N,A′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
Example 8. Let (N,A) ∈ R and (N,A′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 8 with
the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
A =

0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0.5
0 0 0 1
1 0.5 0 0
 and A′ =

0 0 0.5 0.5
1 0 0.5 1
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0

with the same matches matrix
M =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
 .
Let (N,A′′) = (N,A+ A′) ∈ RR be the sum of these two ranking problems.
The rating vectors are given in Table 6: Cfb1(N,A) < Cfb3(N,A) and Cfb1(N,A
′) <
Cfb3(N,A
′), but Cfb1(N,A′′) > Cfb3(N,A′′).
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Table 6: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 8
fb(A) dfb(A) Cfb(A) fb(A′) dfb(A′) Cfb(A′) fb(A′′) dfb(A′′) Cfb(A′′)
X1 1/17 −6/19 −83/323 5/64 −23/64 −9/32 17/236 −79/244 −906/3599
X2 10/17 −1/19 173/323 39/64 −5/64 17/32 145/236 −15/244 1990/3599
X3 2/17 −7/19 −81/323 11/64 −25/64 −7/32 31/236 −97/244 −958/3599
X4 4/17 −5/19 −9/323 9/64 −11/64 −1/32 43/236 −53/244 −126/3599
6 Additivity and irrelevant comparisons
Definition 6.1. Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM): Let (N,R,M) ∈ R be a
ranking problem and Xi, Xj, Xk, X` ∈ N be four different objects. Let f : R → Rn be a
scoring procedure such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M) and (N,R′,M) ∈ R be a ranking
problem identical to (N,R,M) except for the result r′k` 6= rk`. f is called independent of
irrelevant matches if fi(N,R
′,M) ≥ fj(N,R′,M).
IIM means that all comparisons not involving the chosen objects are irrelevant from
the perspective of their relative ranking. It appears as independence in Rubinstein (1980,
Axiom III) and Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Axiom 5) for round-robin ranking problems.
The name independence of irrelevant matches was introduced by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.
(2014), however, they also allowed for a change in the number of matches between two
objects (i.e. a′k` 6= ak` implies that possibly both r′k` 6= rk` and m′k` 6= mk`), which seems
to be too general for us. Altman and Tennenholtz (2008, Definition 8.4) introduces a
still stronger axiom called Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives by permitting
modifications of comparisons involving Xi and Xj if rih − r′ih = rjh − r′jh holds for all
Xh ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}.
Remark 6. Property IIM has a meaning if n ≥ 4.
Sequential application of independence of irrelevant matches can result in a ranking
problem (N,R′,M) ∈ R, for which r′gh = rgh if {Xg, Xh} ∩ {Xi, Xj} 6= ∅, but all other
paired comparisons are arbitrary.
Lemma 6.1. The score method satisfies IIM .
Proposition 6.1. The generalised row sum, least squares, fair bets, dual fair bets and
Copeland fair bets methods violate IIM .
Proof.
Example 9. Let (N,R,M) ∈ R and (N,R′,M) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure
9 with set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
A =

0 0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0
 and A′ =

0 0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0.5 0 1
0.5 0 0 0
 ,
where a′34 6= a34.
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Figure 9: Ranking problems of Example 9
(a) Ranking problem (N,R,M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N,R′,M)
X1
X2
X3
X4
IIM requires that f1(N,R,M) ≥ f2(N,R,M) ⇔ f1(N,R′,M) ≥ f2(N,R′,M). Let
x(ε)(N,R,M) = x(ε), x(ε)(N,R′,M ′) = x(ε)′ and q(N,R,M) = q, q(N,R′,M ′) = q′.
Here
x1(ε) = x2(ε)
′ = (1 + εmn)
ε
(1 + 2ε)(1 + 4ε)
=
ε
1 + 2ε
and
x1(ε)
′ = x2(ε) = (1 + εmn)
−ε
(1 + 2ε)(1 + 4ε)
=
−ε
1 + 2ε
,
that is, X1 x(ε)(N,R,M) X2 but X1 ≺x(ε)(N,R′,M) X2.
Regarding the least squares method, on the basis of Lemma 2.2:
q1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)
mn
= q′2 =
limε→∞ x2(ε)′
mn
=
1
2
· 1
4
=
1
8
and
q′1 =
limε→∞ x1(ε)′
mn
= q2 =
limε→∞ x2(ε)
mn
= −1
2
· 1
4
= −1
8
.
Hence X1 q(N,R,M) X2 but X1 ≺q(N,R′,M) X2.
Table 7: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 9
fb(N,A) dfb(N,A) Cfb(N,A) fb(N,A′) dfb(N,A′) Cfb(N,A′)
X1 5/16 −3/16 1/8 3/16 −5/16 −1/8
X2 3/16 −5/16 −1/8 5/16 −3/16 1/8
X3 1/16 −7/16 −3/8 7/16 −1/16 3/8
X4 7/16 −1/16 3/8 1/16 −7/16 −3/8
The other three rating vectors are given in Table 7. Thus fb1(N,A) > fb2(N,A),
dfb1(N,A) > dfb2(N,A) and Cfb1(N,A) > Cfb2(N,A), but fb1(N,A
′) < fb2(N,A′),
dfb1(N,A
′) < dfb2(N,A′) and Cfb1(N,A′) < Cfb2(N,A′), which is a contradiction.
Remark 7. In Example 9, the two ranking problems coincide with the permutation
σ(X1) = X2 and σ(X3) = X4. Therefore independence of irrelevant matches demands
that f1(N,R,M) = f2(N,R,M), which is violated by all ranking methods discussed except
for the score.
Lemma 6.2. The generalised row sum and least squares methods satisfy IIM on the set
RR.
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Proof. Due to the axioms agreement (Chebotarev, 1994, Property 3) and score consistency
(Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014), both the generalised row sum and least squares methods
coincide with the score on this set of problems, so Lemma 6.1 holds.
Proposition 6.2. Fair bets, dual fair bets and Copeland fair bets methods violate IIM
on the set RR.
Figure 10: Ranking problems of Example 10
(a) Ranking problem (N,A)
X1
X2
X3
X4
(b) Ranking problem (N,A′)
X1
X2
X3
X4
Proof.
Example 10. Let (N,A) ∈ R and (N,A′) ∈ R be the ranking problems in Figure 10 with
the set of objects N = {X1, X2, X3, X4} and tournament matrices
A =

0 1 0 0.5
0 0 0.5 1
1 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 1 0
 and A′ =

0 1 0 0.5
0 0 0.5 1
1 0.5 0 1
0.5 0 0 0
 ,
where a′34 6= a34.
Table 8: Fair bets and associated rating vectors of Example 10
fb(N,A) dfb(N,A) Cfb(N,A) fb(N,A′) dfb(N,A′) Cfb(N,A′)
X1 1/4 −1/4 0 5/32 −7/32 −1/16
X2 1/4 −1/4 0 7/32 −5/32 1/16
X3 1/4 −1/4 0 19/32 −1/32 9/16
X4 1/4 −1/4 0 1/32 −19/32 −9/16
IIM requires that f1(N,R,M) ≥ f2(N,R,M) ⇔ f1(N,R′,M) ≥ f2(N,R′,M). The
rating vectors are given in Table 8. Thus fb1(N,A) ≥ fb2(N,A), dfb1(N,A) ≥ dfb2(N,A)
and Cfb1(N,A) ≥ Cfb2(N,A), but fb1(N,A′) < fb2(N,A′), dfb1(N,A′) < dfb2(N,A′)
and Cfb1(N,A
′) < Cfb2(N,A′), which is a contradiction.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014, p. 165) consider independence of irrelevant matches a
drawback of the score method because outside the subdomain of round-robin ranking
problems, it makes sense for the scoring procedure to be responsive to the strength of the
opponents.
Our discussion is finalized by linking IIM to additivity.
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Theorem 6.1. NEU , CS and SYM imply IIM .
Proof. For the round-robin case, see Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981, Lemma 3).
Assume to the contrary, and let (N,R,M) ∈ R be a ranking problem, Xi, Xj, Xk, X` ∈
N be four different objects such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M), (N,R′,M) ∈ R is
identical to (N,R,M) except for the result a′k` 6= ak`, but fi(N,R′,M) < fj(N,R′,M).
Corollary 6 implies that a consistent and symmetric scoring procedure satisfies INV ,
hence fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M). Denote σ : N → N the permutation σ(Xi) = Xj,
σ(Xj) = Xi, and σ(Xk) = Xk for all Xk ∈ N \ {Xi, Xj}. By neutrality, fi [σ(N,R,M)] ≤
fj [σ(N,R,M)], and fi [σ(N,−R′,M)] < fj [σ(N,−R′,M)] due to inversion and Remark
2. With the definition R′′ = σ(R)− σ(R′)−R +R = 0,
(N,R′′,M ′′) = σ(N,R,M) + σ(N,−R′,M)− (N,R,M) + (N,R′,M).
Symmetry implies fi(N,R
′′,M) = fj(N,R′′,M), consistency results in fi(N,R′′,M) <
fj(N,R
′′,M), a contradiction.
Since NEU and SYM are difficult to debate, CS is an axiom one would rather not
have in the general case. It highlights the significance of Section 5 as weakening of
consistency seems to be desirable in axiomatizations on the whole set R.
7 Conclusions
Table 9: Axiomatic properties of ranking methods
Property Score Generalised
row sum
(fixed ε)
Generalised
row sum
(variable ε)
Least
squares
Fair bets /
Dual fair
bets
Copeland
fair bets
NEU 4 4 4 4 4 4
SYM 4 4 4 4 4 4
INV 4 4 4 4 7 4
HOM 4 7 4 4 4 4
SI 4 4 4 4 7 7
CS 4 7 7 7 7 7
FP 4 4 4 4 4 4
EP 4 7 7 7 7 7
RCS 4 7 4 4 7 7
IIM 4 7 7 7 7 7
Our results are summarized in Table 9. Score satisfies all properties, however, we have
seen that IIM is not favourable in the presence of missing and multiple comparisons. The
findings recommend the use of generalised row sum with a variable parameter, somewhat
proportional to the number of matches like the upper bound of reasonable choice as
ε = 1/ [m(n− 2)]. It is not surprising given the statistical background of the method
(Chebotarev, 1994). With this definition, generalised row sum and least squares cannot
be distinguished with respect to the axioms examined.3 A drawback of fair bets (and its
3 Their main differences are highlighted by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014).
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Figure 11: Connections among the axioms (arrows sign implications)
IIM
NEU
CS
SYM INV
RCS
EP FP
dual) was eliminated by the introduction of Copeland fair bets, but it does not have much
effect for other properties. Chebotarev and Shamis (1999)’s results about self-consistent
monotonicity also confirm that ’manipulation’ with win-loss combining scoring procedures
is not able to correct some inherent features of this class.
Copeland fair bets has two significant weakness compared to generalised row sum and
least squares, the breaking of scale invariance and result consistency. SI is essential for
practical applications and offers a way to convert all ranking problems into an irreducible
one. Therefore it is worth to investigate scale invariance for other methods defined on
the domain RI , some of them are presented in Chebotarev and Shamis (1999, Table 1).
Result consistency means a problem because of its immediate interpretation. For instance,
Proposition 5.7 suggests that a player worse in both half of a round-robin tournament
than another can overtake it on the basis of aggregated results. It may have strange
consequences.
We have aspired to give simple counterexamples, minimal with respect to the number
of objects and matches. It shows that the violation of these properties remains an issue
for small problems. All axioms have also been analysed on the restricted domain of round-
robin ranking problems. Then the generalised row sum and least squares coincides with
the score, while fair bets and its peers violate all properties on this set, too (in some cases
with a marginal increase in complexity). According to our opinion, it makes their use
debatable for ranking purposes, despite Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2014) does not mention as
a drawback that fair bets deviates from the score on the set RR.
Figure 11 gives a comprehensive picture about our axioms. HOM and SI does not
fit into it, however, Corollary 5 refers to some link between homogeneity and result con-
sistency. HOM certainly does not imply RCS (see the properties of fair bets), but it
remains an open question whether there exists a scoring procedure satisfying only the lat-
ter or not. These results shed light on some discoveries of Table 9. The strong connection
of IIM and CS justifies the violation of both properties. EP was constructed as a weak
form of additivity by an idea from FP , but it does not proved to be successful. Result
consistency yields some positive outcomes and, besides SI, it motivates our setting with
the differentiation of result and matches matrices. We think that further investigation of
additivity may help the understanding of scoring procedures.
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We see two main directions for future research. The first is to extend the scope of
the analysis with other scoring procedures. For example, Slikker et al. (2012) defines a
general framework for ranking the nodes of directed graphs, resulting in fair bets as a
limit. Positional power (Herings et al., 2005) is also worth to analyse since it is the pair
of least squares from a graph-theoretic point of view (Csato´, 2014). The second course is
the introduction of new axioms with the final aim of characterization results, an intended
end goal of our analysis. Nevertheless, it may be a difficult road.
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